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ABSTRACT
In this work, we analyze the advantages of multi-hop data frag-
mentation in unattended wireless sensor networks (UWSN) and
propose a lightweight protocol to achieve it. UWSN has recently
become an important aspect in various areas of sensor networks
where real-time data collection is difficult to manage. However, the
characteristics of UWSN also poses new problems especially in data
protection. For more efficient protection, data fragmentation has
been proposed to fragment sensing data, which prevents attackers
from successfully exploiting the data. However, there are currently
minimal work on the strategies of the placement of fragments in-
side a sensor network. Through this work, we analyze the effects
of multi-hop fragment dispersal in relation to effectiveness of data
protection and energy consumption. Furthermore, we design a new
routing algorithm suitable for the energy-efficient placement of
data fragments in UWSN.We utilize simulation-basedmodeling and
testbed implementation via FIT/IoT-Lab to prove the effectiveness
of our work.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
In various applications that require usage of a wireless sensor net-
work (WSN), it can be difficult to use the commonly assumed net-
work environment of WSN, which is the interaction and multi-hop
wireless communication between a sink node and multiple sensors.
This is the case of hostile environments such as battlefields and
inaccessible regions (e.g. fallout sites) where it could be difficult to
collect sensing data and manage the network in real-time manner.
In these specific cases, it is more preferable to utilize itinerant sinks
to be able to collect sensing data per demand. In the near future,
we can envision new Internet of Things (IoT) services, comprised
of high-tech devices, such as automated unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) to act as sink nodes in a sensor network to be able to pro-
vide these functionalities. Such kind of sensor network architecture
has been defined by researchers as the unattended wireless sensor
networks (UWSN) [17].
In UWSN, one of the most important factors is the survivability
of the data, which takes into account whether a data generated
by a sensor node is successfully transferred to the itinerant sink
node. This is especially critical in UWSN because the data must be
stored in the unattended sensors before an itinerant sink arrives in
the proximity to receive the data. During this time, the data can be
a viable target to attackers, who are also mobile and either steal,
modify, or erase the data from the sensor nodes [21][22].
One of the potential technologies to enhance the survivability
of the data is data fragmentation[4][12][13]. The general purpose
of data fragmentation is to fragment a data k into fk fragments
through a cryptographic means. An itinerant sink can decode the
data by collecting f ′k number of fragments where f
′
k ≤ fk . If the f ′k
is high enough, it becomes more difficult for an attacker to be able
to successfully exploit the data, as it must attack multiple sensors
to be able to collect f ′k fragments. Therefore, data fragmentation
provides protection of the data itself, while also providing some
flexibility even if some of the fragments are erased or not received
by the itinerant sink node.
However, majority of the state-of-the-art in data fragmentation
only consider the security aspects, as in how to fragment the data
and defragment them again. They do not consider where to place
the fragments in the sensor network, even though it is very likely
that in a sensor network, there can be numerous number of de-
ployed sensors, while the conditions of which sensors can receive
a data fragment can be very dynamic. Moreover, for the sake of
transferring data to remote sensors, multi-hop routing protocols
are needed. The general architecture of UWSN does not need multi-
hop routing, therefore adding a routing layer just for the sake of
transferring data fragments induce considerable energy consump-
tion and bandwidth consumption from control packet transmission.
Even though some epidemic flooding methods are proposed to dis-
seminate data to remote sensor nodes [23][1], these are methods
used for replication of same data, which have different character-
istics and objectives compared to data fragmentation. Therefore,
it is difficult to use epidemic protocols for dissemination of data
fragments without inducing heavy overhead, because fragmented
data are different in detail.
In this paper, we look at some methods on the dispersal of data
fragments within a UWSN. The main objective of our research is
based on the fact that data fragmentation, being a effective and
reliable method to prevent data exploitation, must be used, even
at the cost of more energy consumption. However, to improve the
security of data fragmentation itself, multi-hop fragment dispersal
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is needed. However, this incurs more data transmissions in the
network, increasing energy consumption of the network. Thus,
our first contribution is finding the relation of the distance of data
fragments from the origin in regards to an assumed attacker model.
Also, our model analyzes the effect of remote fragmentation and
its relations to energy consumption. Then, we focus on the fact
that multi-hop data fragment dispersal requires a multi-hop routing
protocol, which is bound to create even more network overhead. To
solve this problem, we consider a method to transfer data fragments
to remote sensors without utilization of costly existing routing
protocols. More specifically, we propose a sink-node oriented route
configuration protocol, which show how existing routing protocols
can be modified to not induce excessive overhead to each sensor
node, while majority of the processing is focused on the sink node.
We compare the performance of our proposed method to other
data fragment dispersion methods, and show that our method is
superior to its counterparts in terms of data protection and energy
efficiency. For our analysis we utilize simulation-based modeling
tools to strengthen our initial beliefs, and then utilize the FIT/IoT-
Lab experimentation environment [10] to test our proposed scheme
at a more practical scale.
2 RELATEDWORK
We categorize the related state-of-the-art to three categories. First,
we describe the general methods of considering data survivability
in the UWSN. Then, we emphasize the importance of data frag-
mentation especially for protection of the details of the data, and
explain some literature in regards to this. Finally, we describe some
possible methods of the placement of data fragments in UWSN.
2.1 Regarding data survivability in UWSN
In the early stages of research in UWSN, several types of methods
to provide data survivability was proposed, as well as the attacker
models that can be used to exploit them. In regards to data dis-
persion, there has been some methods used to disperse sensing
data in an area of sensor networks. One of the first researches in
UWSN [21] describe some simple methods, such as DO-NOTHING
(Sensors will keep their own data), MOVE-ONCE (Each sensor
will attempt to transfer its data once to another sensor node), and
KEEP-MOVING (continuously move the data between sensor nodes
until the sink is found). Some more recent work[23][1] states that
against erasure attacks, replication of data, where several copies of
the same data are transferred to other sensor nodes, prove to be the
most efficient. To provide efficient replication, these researchers
propose various epidemic approaches based on controlled flooding.
However, while the replication of data is efficient against data
erasure attacks, it becomes even more susceptible to data acqui-
sition attacks, where the motive of the attacker is to steal and
analyze the sensing data. This is because an attacker only needs to
access one of the many replicas in the network to fully grasp the
information of the replicated data. On the other hand, data frag-
mentation method can effectively prevent this problem, because
multiple number of fragments must be collected by an attacker to
fully understand the details of one data. Even though it was stated
that data fragmentation can be more susceptible to erasure attacks
compared to data replication[21], this can be somewhat alleviated
if number of fragments fk is considerably higher than the required
number of fragments f ′k .
2.2 Data fragmentation
Data fragmentation is another method of data management in
UWSN.When a data is sensed, the original data k is fragmented into
several smaller or same-sized fk fragments, where each fragment is
a variation of the original k that can be individually used to decode
the data. For an itinerant sink to successfully decode the data, it
will require at least a pre-determined f ′k fragments, where f
′
k ≤ fk .
This is the same case for any attacker, therefore it becomes more
difficult for an attacker to successfully exploit the data and use it
for its own purpose.
To fragment the data, several research has been presented that
uses various methods such as encryption through keys[4][25], and
network coding[29]. A more recent research[12] states that sensing
data can be efficiently fragmented based on Information Dispersal
Algorithm (IDA)[16][24]. In this work, the authors state that subsets
of data can be fragmented through multiplications of data vectors
using dispersal matrix. These methods operate without usage of
keys, making it simpler compared to general security measures used
in traditional wireless personal area networks (WPAN). However,
methods based on IDA may have low data protection, based on the
fact that specific patterns of the original data may be exploitable
on the data fragments. To solve this problem, this research also
proposes usage of stream ciphers.
We note that the position of our paper focuses on the actual
placement of data fragments inside a large-scale UWSN where
sensor nodes can transfer data to each other via wireless multi-hop
communication. Therefore, various kinds of data fragmentation
techniques described above can be used in conjunction with our
proposed scheme, regardless of their complexity. The performance
difference between different data fragmentation methods is out of
our scope in this work.
2.3 Data fragmentation placement strategies
Intuitively, we can consider the most basic methods for a sensor
node to disperse its fragments to other sensor nodes. First of all, a
NEAR-FIRST approach can be used, where fk fragments are directly
transferred to the same number of neighbors of the originating sen-
sor node. In this case, only a simple HELLOmechanism between the
sensors are needed to notify each other of their existence. However,
we will later show that dispersion of fragments to closer nodes will
also increase the level of security risk. An alternating method to
this will be the FAR-FIRST approach, where the fragments can be
dispersed to sensor nodes that are furthest from the origin node.
However, this method will require well-designed multi-hop routing
protocols, and sensor nodes to have explicit knowledge of the whole
network architecture. Last of all, we can also choose a complete
RANDOM method, which will also require multi-hop routing as
well as usage of additional energy. We will not consider the afore-
mentioned epidemic flooding methods, as they are suited more for
dissemination of replicated data. One example of adaptive fragment
placement method has been recently proposed [5], which allows
sensor nodes to place fragments to sensor nodes based on their
distance and energy capacity. This method allows data fragments
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Table 1: UWSN Parameters
Notation Value Detail
n 100 No. of sensors in
√
n ∗ √n Grid
d 100m Distance between each node
ts 600s No. of seconds per trip for sink
v 10m/s Speed of attacker node
r 20s Time required for adversary to seize data
fk 6 No. of fragments per data k
fd 3 No. of fragments needed to decode k
d(fk ) variant Avg. distance between each fragment k
to have enough distance between them, as well as prevent con-
centration of fragments to specific nodes to avoid energy holes
and increase network lifetime. However, this work only considers
single-hop network scenarios, which is less complex to manage
compared to multi-hop scenarios.
A problem arises in case a multi-hop routing is required, because
in a traditional UWSN, a routing protocol is not needed. This is
because the sink node travels around the network to collect the
data, which allows all sensor nodes to transfer their data directly
to the itinerant sink node. Applying traditional routing protocols
in sensor networks and mobile ad hoc networks such as routing
for low-power and lossy networks (RPL)[28], ad hoc on-demand
distance vector routing (AODV)[20], or optimized link state routing
(OLSR)[6], causes additional control packet overheads. For example,
AODV (from request and reply messages) and OLSR (from peri-
odical topology control) methods induce heavy overhead in the
entire network to find and update shortest routes between nodes.
Also, even though RPL is considered an efficient tree-based rout-
ing method for sensor networks, it cannot be used effectively in
UWSN because there is no static tree root. Furthermore, in the
field of WSN, there has been various work that tries to create a
multi-hop route between sensor nodes and a mobile sink[26]. All
routing methods here are out of scope in our case, because these
works focus on the creation of multi-hop links between sensor
nodes and the mobile sink. Our concern in this work, on the other
hand, is creation of routes between sensor nodes themselves to
share fragments. Therefore, all things considered, a more efficient
method of routing methods are needed for efficient placement of
data fragments in UWSN.
3 ANALYSIS OF DATA FRAGMENTATION
PLACEMENT STRATEGIES
In this section, we make a simulation-based analysis, showing that
efficient placement of data fragments is needed in UWSN for more
secure protection of the data. However, also at the same time, we
present some results showing that we cannot optimize the security
due to energy reasons. For this, we design a simulation model of a
UWSN environment and use it for our evaluation.
3.1 Environment Configuration
First of all, a grid topology is considered with
√
n ∗ √n sensors,
where value n is configured to 100, as shown in Table 1. In our
scenario, the difference in the number of sensors will not play a big
role in the difference of performance, as the effects of the size of
the network and its density can be also emulated through the speed
and mobility of the itinerant sink and the attacker. Therefore, in
our case, we will statically configure the size of the network while
varying the metrics of the sink and attacker instead. In the grid,
each sensor node is capable of wireless communication with all of
its adjacent sensor nodes, with the distance between each vertical-
horizontal node configured as d meters. Therefore, the nodes not
on the edge of the network will have 4 neighbors each, with trans-
mission range higher than d
√
2. We select the grid topology as it
is the most common deployment of sensors, and it can provide a
basic understanding of the behavior of the network environment.
Other topologies can be used to test more dynamic and extreme
cases of behaviors, which differs in density of sensors (nodes con-
centrated in specific areas of networks), congestion of data traffic
(line topologies where data are concentrated to specific nodes), and
etc.. In our preliminary analysis, we will focus more into the basic
behaviors of the network while we test a different topology in our
real-life experiments shown later in our work.
In the network, we assume that there is one itinerant sink node s
which makes a trip to all the nodes in the network per every period.
This means that s will be in d
√
2 meters of each node at least once
per trip. The time for one periodical trip is ts seconds. Therefore,
every ts seconds, when a sensor node meets the itinerant sink, it
will transfer all data fragments that it has collected in its storage,
and then purge the storage so that the data cannot be retrieved by
the attacker.
In the case of the attacker node a, it is assumed to launch a
data retrieval attack on the sensor nodes. This means that its main
priority is tomake a physical connection to each sensor in proximity,
access the storage, and seize all data inside it. On the other hand,
we do not consider eavesdropping attack as a method to seize
data fragments. This is because UWSN naturally has delay-tolerant
characteristics, and generation of data fragments can be irregular
with high delays. Therefore, it is difficult for the attacker to predict
when fragments are transmitted between nodes.
After a successful seizure attack, the attacker node will move
its location to another sensor node, traveling at a speed of v m/s.
For the mobility model, we assume a simple Manhattan mobility
model[8], which is suitable for modeling a randommovement inside
the grid environment. If we assume that it takes r seconds for an
attacker node to seize data from one sensor node, average time
needed for attacking one sensor node will be (d/v) + r seconds.
The number of attackers can be multiple, but should be limited
to small numbers, as large-scale attacks may be discovered by the
service provider. Taking these models into account, an attack will
be considered successful if the attacker nodes acquire f ′k fragments
before all the fragments are purged.
Note that in our current analysis, we do not consider more so-
phisticated and high-performance attack models as described in
previous work due to space limitations[17]. These sophisticated
attacks can increase the probability of a successful attack, or even
downright invalidate the need for multi-hop dispersion of data if an
attacker can comprehend all sensor nodes even before the itinerant
sink can make one successful trip. However, we argue that this is
unrealistic in the sense that this will dramatically increase the cost
3
and complexity of the attacker, as well as become easily exploitable
by the service provider so that it can take other evasive measures
to protect against the attack. In any case, our goal in this work is
to analyze the danger of a realistic mobility and attack behavior
of attackers (such as drones) so that it can be used as a reference
to future studies, and that future works can be enhanced from this
stage of work.
3.2 Analysis of exploitation
In the start of the network, a random sensor node will create data k
and fk number of fragments of k . When the fragments are dispersed
to other sensor nodes, we assume that each sensor node can have
at maximum 1 fragment of that corresponding data. This will force
the attacker node to be mobile, as it must comprehend more than
one sensor to be able to retrieve enough fragments to successfully
decode the data. However, in some other scenarios, this value can
be increased up to fd − 1 per sensor node, depending on its energy
capabilities or centrality. In any case, the reason that this value must
be limited to fd − 1 is to prevent stationary attackers attacking only
a single node, where they can exploit sensing data if more than
fd − 1 fragments of the same data are stored at one sensor node at
any time.
When dispersing the fragments to other sensors, a major fac-
tor that must be considered is the average distance between the
location of each fragmented data of fk , which we define as d(fk ).
Therefore, a higher value of d(fk ) will mean that an attack node
must also travel further in average to retrieve a fragment of the
same kind. Therefore, our first evaluation is to observe the perfor-
mance of the network based on the value of d(fk ) when dispersing
the fragments to other sensors. We use MATLAB software to ana-
lyze this, using the configurations of parameters shown in TABLE 1.
The main performance we want to observe is the percentage of data
seizure, which we define as the successful ratio of attack compared
to the failed attacks of data seizure. Afterwards, we also tune other
parameters such as ts , (d/v) + r , and fk to observe their effects on
the percentage of data seizure.
In Fig. 1(a), we measure the effect of d(fk ) on the attack suc-
cess ratio of the attacker. We denote the x-axis as an index of d(fk ),
which is the value denoting number of hops. We can clearly observe
that high d(fk ) value can significantly lower the success ratio of
data seizure by the attacker node. As the attacker node is also a mo-
bile device which may be in flight (drone) or on the move (human,
vehicle), the physical distance of the fragments plays an important
role on the survivability of the data. However, it is not just the dis-
tance between the originating sensor node and the other fragments.
It is in fact also important to scatter all fragments throughout the
network in a distributed manner, to increase the average value of
d(fk ). As the number of attackers increase, we can observe that
only the maximal value of d(fk ) guarantees full security. Here, max-
imum d(fk ) denotes the highest value of average distance between
fragment, which in our scenario was near equivalent to 10. The
maximum value can slightly vary depending on the original posi-
tion of the generated data. However, selecting the maximum value
is not always the most efficient, as there are less number of choices
to acquire the maximum, and the selection of sensor nodes for
fragmentation becomes more easily predictable (edge/corner of the
network). Furthermore, we will also see that higher values of d(fk )
result in additional energy consumption. Therefore, it is important
to find the best trade-off between these parameters suitable for each
scenario. In the next section, we explain our method of fragment
placement based on this problem.
Fig. 1(b) through Fig. 1(e) shows some results of basic placement
techniques, NEAR-FIRST, RANDOM placement, and static d(fk ) =
6 and 8, which was obtained in Fig. 1(a) with 0% attack chance
when there is only one attacker. Fig. 1(b) and Fig. 1(d) shows the
attack success ratio depending on some parameters that can be
controlled from the service provider’s side. We can see that more
frequent visits made by the itinerant sink can make the network
more resilient. However, this can also increase the overall cost
of the network, as well as increase the energy consumption of
both the itinerant sink and sensor nodes. Therefore, the value of ts
should also be configured based on the trade-off between energy
and security. In Fig. 1(c), we vary the value of fd while configuring
the fk = 2fd . Contrary to our intuitive belief, increasing the number
of fragments per data does not dramatically affect the resiliency
of the network, as shown in the figure. This is mainly due to the
fact that while increasing fk actually increases a chance that a
fragment can be exploited by the attacker, increase of fd makes it
also more difficult for the attacker to decode the message. Rather,
it is in fact the percentage of fd in relation to fk , that affects the
resiliency of the network. In Fig. 1(d), we configure fk to 8 while
the fd value is varied. We can observe that a higher level of fd
guarantees higher resiliency to attacks. However, if fd becomes
closer to fk , several other problems may occur. One example is
that it becomes especially weak against erasure attacks, where
deletion of just one fragment also prevents the itinerant sink node
to successfully decode the data. Note that to provide a high rate
of resiliency, more fragments must be used, as low number of fk
cannot guarantee a high percentage of fd in relation to fk .
On the other hand, there are also several factors that can be
controlled by the attackers. For example, a shorter value of (d/v)+r
will cause the same effect of increasing the ts value of the sink,
because the attacker will have more chances to attack more nodes
before the trip is concluded by the sink node. Also, increase in the
number of attackers affect the data seizure percentage, as shown
in Fig. 1(e). Depending on the attacker’s objective, the number of
attackers can be increased to make the attack more efficient, but
at the same time, too much increase can make the attack more
revealing to the service provider. We can observe through these
results that multi-hop placement of data fragments is an important
technique that needs to be addressed for better management of a
UWSN.
3.3 Analysis of additional overhead
Even though multi-hop dispersion of fragments can increase data
survivability, it will also induce additional energy usage. This is
quite intuitive as seen in various communication modules used in
sensor networks[2], where every time spent in transmission (ttx )
and reception (trx ) causes a device to use more energy than being in
an IDLE state. For example, per each fragment created by a sensor
node, the resulting additional energy overhead ef per fragment can
be calculated as
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(a) Distance between fragments (d (fk )) vs Data seizure
percentage
(b) Sink trip time (ts ) vs Data seizure percentage (c) Number of fragments (fk ) vs Data seizure percentage
(d) Fragments required to decode (fd ) vs Data seizure per-
centage
(e) Number of attackers vs Data seizure percentage (f) Distance between fragments (d (fk )) vs Average ek
Figure 1: Analysis of data fragment dispersion
ef =
hf∑
i=1
(etx ∗ pi + erx ), (1)
where pi denotes the percentage of the maximum transmission
power (0 ≤ pi ≤ 1) of each transmitting node in the multi-hop
transmission, and hf represents the number of hops needed to
deliver the fragment to a destination’s sensor node. Note that we
do not consider any losses and retransmissions due to instability of
the network. Therefore, energy consumption induced by each data
ek generated by a sensor is
ek =
fk∑
i=1
ef , (2)
On the other hand, dispersion of data fragments in single-hop
scenario will only induce ek =
∑fk
i=1(ttx ∗ pn + trx ). Therefore,
intuitively we can see that higher value of hf will cause steadily
increase in the energy consumption. We visualize this equation
through Fig. 1(f), which shows the average amount of energy used
in the network per data based on an actual energy model defined
in [2]. We can observe that the increase in energy consumption is
quite linear, as the increase in number of hops is also linear to value
of d(fk ). As mentioned previously, selecting the maximum value of
d(fk ) is not efficient because the location of of fragments become
easily predictable. Therefore, at least in our scenario, a value of
d(fk ) = 6 or 8 will be most efficient performance wise, which can
be decided depending on the number of attackers in the network.
Note that different d(fk ) values will be efficient in different cases
of network, and we show that these values can be found through
our method of analysis.
So far, we have observed the energy consumption generated
from additional transmission induced from fragments. However,
another major problem here is that we have only considered so
far the additional transmission overhead, without consideration of
the routing process itself. Generally, to create the routing tables
to transmit data in a multi-hop fashion, additional control packet
overhead is also induced by the routing protocol. First of all, we
consider periodical transmission of HELLO message. This is the
most basic transmission by each node to notify their existence in
the network/routing layer. Therefore, this can be considered an
inevitable overhead that exists in most networks. However, other
popular routing protocols are already known to generate various
control overheads. AODV[20] is prone to generating much control
overhead, especially during the route request process in UWSN.
This is because the reactive properties of AODV does not create
a total map of the network, and each node wanting to send data
must flood request packets to the entire network every time a
destination needs to be found. On the other hand, OLSR[6] fares
better in this scenario because a global routing map can be created
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proactively for every sensor node. However, the proactive route
update for topology control in turn causes periodical broadcasting
in the network, which is also a heavy process. To remove frequent
broadcast or flooding in the network, geographical routing methods
such as Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR)[14] can be used,
which utilizes a greedy data forwarding mechanism without any
proactive or reactive route table updates. However, GPSR needs
location information for each sensor, and usage of global positioning
system on sensor nodes in turn uses energy and unsuitable for small,
embedded sensor devices.
In our main proposed scheme, we consider how we can reduce
energy consumption of the routing protocol in UWSN. As we have
already explained how existing routing protocols in the mobile ad
hoc networks cannot be used in this case, we make modifications
to make them suitable for dispersion of data fragments in UWSN.
4 MULTI-HOP DATA FRAGMENTATION
Our main goal of the proposed scheme is to develop a routing
protocol suitable for UWSN, which uses only HELLO messages to
share between sensor nodes and the itinerant sink to create routes
for fragment distribution in UWSN. The main idea of the scheme is
to: (a) minimize control packet transmission between sensor nodes
for creating routes, and (b) let the itinerant sink node to do most
of the job. The scheme can be divided into four phases: (1) HELLO
transmission, (2) Data collection and storage, (3) Route creation,
and (4) Route distribution.
4.1 HELLO transmission
Each sensor periodically transmits a HELLO packet with a pre-
determined transmission power and time. For simplicity, we will
not take into account power control schemes that may affect the
number of neighbors for each sensor node. Inside each HELLO
packet, a sensor node includes its ID, ID list of its neighbors (which
is obtained through the HELLO packet itself), and the expected
transmission count(ETX)[7] of each neighboring node’s HELLO
packet when they are received. The ETX will be used to judge the
transmission quality of the link between each neighboring node
in the routing layer, by counting the number of HELLO packets
actually received compared to how much that should have been
received over a period of time. This also allows the itinerant sink
node to analyze if each link is bi-directional or unidirectional. For
the link quality measurement, other information from the physical
layer such as received signal strength indicator (RSSI) or signal
to noise ratio (SNR) can be used. However, it is also known that
these physical layer signal measurements can be affected by deteri-
orated environments and may not be accurate[19][9]. Therefore,
in our case, we utilize a routing layer information which explicitly
shows direct information on the successful transmission of HELLO
packets.
4.2 Data collection and storage
While the HELLO packet is constantly generated, shared, and up-
dated by all the sensor nodes in the network, itinerant sink will
also listen to the HELLO of all the sensor nodes while making its
pre-determined trip following a mobility model. We assume that
the itinerant sink will be in the communication range of all sensor
Figure 2: Data collection and storage by itinerant sink
nodes at least once while on the move. Therefore, the itinerant
sink can obtain the neighboring node information of all nodes, thus
creating a list for each node ns containing node ID, node’s neighbor
list and link quality neiдhn,ETX . Also, a rough indication of each
node’s location is recorded, by recording the itinerant sink’s own
coordinates when a HELLO is received while on the move. For this,
a positioning system needs to be installed in the drone, which is
a common practice in recent applications[15]. An example of data
collection by the itinerant sink and the format of data storage is
shown in Fig. 2.
After gathering lists from each node in the network, the itinerant
sink can create a global graph of nodes and edges based on the
neighbor list. This graph will result in a bi-directional link multi-
hop network, which will be used by the itinerant sink to generate
routes using routing protocols.
4.3 Route creation
After the itinerant sink makes a full trip of the entire network,
the sink will commence the selection of candidates that will store
the fragments and multi-hop paths for each of these nodes. Firstly,
based on the graph created by the itinerant sink, it can create a
crude map of the entire network. Using this information, the sink
will cluster all sensor nodes into areas recorded through its location.
The number of clusters can be similar to a pre-determined fk for
all sensor nodes, which would allow one data fragment per cluster.
For example, if fk = 4, the entire network will be divided into four
even areas, and then each sensor will be classified into each area
depending on the location it was recognized by the sink node. One
of the most simple methods of clustering the sensors is to use a
k-means clustering[3] algorithm, which accepts the x ,y coordinates
as the criteria to categorize while k = fk .
As the itinerant sink is making a continuous trip through a pre-
defined mobility model, there is a very high chance that a sensor
can be recognized by the sink node in more than one location.
In this case, before the k-means clustering phase, the multiple
coordinates of each node can be merged to find the average point,
which would actually denote a more accurate location information
than using only one coordinate. For example, if three or more points
are found per node, then tri- or multi-lateration [18][27] can be
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used to tune the location of each sensor node through the RSS
information received by the sink and the location of where each
sensor node was sensed.
After each sensor node is clustered into areas, one sensor node
is randomly selected per each area. Therefore, there will be fk − 1
sensor nodes that are selected for each sensor node’s destination
for data fragmentation, excluding the fragment that will remain
at the originator sensor node. Note that for our current work, we
select a simple random selection method for selecting fragment
destinations. This will in fact not guarantee the highest d(fk ) for
all fragments. However, if we always try to achieve the highest
d(fk ) for destinations, the fragments will always be transferred to
sensor nodes that are at the edge of the network, causing unbal-
anced dispersion of fragments within the network. This makes the
fragmentation predictable and causes these edge nodes to become
higher priority nodes to be selected for an attack if the attackers are
aware of the algorithm. Furthermore, the edge nodes and the inter-
mediate routing nodes towards the edge nodes will consume much
more energy, which will result in reduction of network lifetime.
In some cases, complete random selection of sensor nodes in
each cluster may pose some problems; for example selection of two
neighboring sensor nodes in different clusters. However, this can
be easily avoided, as the itinerant sink can compare the locations of
each sensor node upon selection and re-select if such case occurs.
This is possible as the itinerant sink has global information of the
network.
After random selection of sensor nodes, for each sensor node
ns , sink node selects one multi-hop route for each selected desti-
nation nd , eventually creating fk multi-hop routes in the process.
To do this, a specific multi-hop wireless routing protocol must
be used. Here, we show three possibilities of using existing rout-
ing techniques modified to work in our case: 1) Source routing, 2)
Table-driven routing, and 3) Geographical routing.
4.3.1 Source routing. As an simple example, source-routing such
as Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol[11] can be used, where
multi-hop routes are normally created using route request broadcast
packets and route reply packets. This is possible because the sink
node maintains a bi-directional graph of all nodes in the network,
based on the lists of neighbor information. Therefore, instead of
running the DSR protocol in each of the nodes via a distributed
manner, we compute it all at the sink node via a centralized manner.
The main difference is that for the routing metric, we utilize the
ETX, which is a better choice for bi-directional link compared to
the generic hop-count metric. DSR’s route request process is heavy
in communication point of view as it requires flooding of messages,
but can be a much simpler process if done only in a computational
manner by the sink node. Algorithm 1 shows the process of DSR
inside the itinerant sink.
The computational complexity of DSR in the itinerant sink will
therefore be O(n2), as the RouteCreate function will be called for
each sensor node while RouteRequest function will also be called for
all nodes at most once every time a RouteCreate function is called.
The advantage is that RouteCreate does not have to be called for
each destination, as one flooding process is enough to discover all
destinations. Also, the centralized DSR does not require a route
reply phase, which is used in its traditional version. This is because
Algorithm 1 Centralized DSR
1: function RouteCreate(src , neiдhsrc , dest )
2: for each n in neighbor list neiдhsrc do
3: met = netx
4: seq = src
5: RouteRequest(n,met , seq, dest )
6: end for
7: end function
1: function RouteReqest(int ,met , seq, dest )
2: if int ∈ dest then
3: STORE seq andmet
4: SELECT seq with lowestmet return seq
5: end if
6: if already called RouteRequest AND met is higher than
storedmet then
return
7: end if
8: for each n in neighbor list neiдhint do
9: met+ = netx
10: seq = seq⌢int
11: RouteRequest(n,met , seq, dest )
12: end for
13: end function
the sequence of routes can be created during the route request
phase and are all stored inside a global storage.
However, DSR also has its own drawbackswhen used as a routing
protocol. The main problem is that the multi-hop routing infor-
mation is stored inside the data packet itself. Therefore, when a
sensor node transmits its data fragment to the next-hop sensor
node, it includes the entire multi-hop sequence in the packet so
that this sequence can be referenced by all intermediate nodes in
the sequence. Therefore, the additional communication overhead
per packet is Sa ∗ Nh , where Sa denotes the size of node address
and Nh denotes the number of hops that packet must travel. The
overhead can dramatically increase if the network size and number
of hops increase. However, unlike table-driven routing methods,
DSR does not incur additional storage overhead for each sensor
node.
4.3.2 Table-driven routing. We can also utilize AODV [20] for uti-
lization of table-driven routing in a centralized manner within the
itinerant sink. In this case, the route discovery process is quite sim-
ilar to DSR, which is ideal in this case as all the process of flooding
route request packets are computed only by the sink node. How-
ever, in case of AODV, the sink node must compute a routing table
for each sensor node in the network, and distribute this routing
table during the next trip. The routing table contains the list of all
destination sensor nodes where the fragments must be transmitted
to, followed by the intermediate node addresses for each destina-
tion node as the next-hop forwarding node. Algorithm 2 shows the
process of AODV inside the itinerant sink.
The computational complexity of AODV is similar to DSR even
though there is an extra route reply phase. However, the route reply
phase in AODV is a unicast phase, and the overall overhead that is
incurred from reply is negligible compared to the expensive flooding
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Algorithm 2 Centralized AODV
1: function RouteCreate(src ,neiдhsrc ,dest )
2: for each n in neighbor list neiдhsrc do
3: met = netx
4: RouteRequest(src ,n,src ,met ,dest )
5: end for
6: end function
1: function RouteReqest(src ,int ,prev ,met ,dest )
2: INSERT to table int : previous hop prev , source src , metric
met
3: if int ∈ dest then
4: SELECT src , prev with lowestmet
5: RouteReply(src ,int ,int ,prev)
6: end if
7: if already called RouteRequest AND met is higher than
storedmet then
return
8: end if
9: for each n in neighbor list neiдhint do
10: met+ = netx
11: RouteRequest(src ,n,int ,met ,dest )
12: end for
13: end function
1: function RouteReply(src ,dest i ,next ,int )
2: INSERT to table int : next hop next , destination di
3: if src = int then return
4: else
5: READ from table int : previous hop prev from source
src
6: RouteReply(src ,di ,prev ,int )
7: end if
8: end function
phase that occurs from the route request phase. The main problem
of utilizing AODV in UWSN is that other than the destinations
to sensor nodes for transmitting fragments, intermediate nodes
within a multi-hop route must also record forwarding tables for
other nodes that may utilize it for data forwarding. Therefore, if
the number of sensor nodes increase in the network, so does the
possibility of the routing table size, especially for sensor nodes
situated near the middle of the network. The storage overhead
for each sensor node will be (Sa ∗ 2) ∗ (fk − 1) + (Sa ∗ 2) ∗ Ni ,
where the routing table must contain the destination address and
intermediate address for each outward fragment, plus additional
number of unpredictable Ni intermediate routes that it may be used
as a forwarding node. As sensors generally lack in memory size
due to its constraints, this problem can limit utilization of AODV
in some scenarios.
4.3.3 Geographical routing. In our current UWSN environment,
we consider utilization of geographical routing, more specifically
GPSR [14], as an efficient routing method. Even though we have
mentioned previously that GPSR cannot be usedwithout location in-
formation, in our case we have utilized the itinerant sink to generate
a crude map of sensor nodes based on its own location. Therefore,
the graph updated by the sink can be used in our scenario.
GPSR is based on greedy forwarding mechanism, where multi-
hop routes are generally selected upon the physical closeness to the
destination. The itinerant sink, using GPSR, will create a routing
table for each sensor node, where each destination node’s coor-
dinates are recorded. When the routing table is transferred to a
sensor node, the sensor node will look up the destination node’s
coordinates, find the sensor node in its neighbor table which is
closest to the destination, and then simply forward the data to the
closest neighbor. Algorithm 3 shows the process of GPSR inside
the itinerant sink.
Algorithm 3 Centralized GPSR
1: function FindCoordinate(src ,dest )
2: for each dest i of src do
return dest ix ,dest iy
3: end for
4: end function
As observed in this algorithm, the workload of the itinerant sink
is clearly lower than that of centralized AODV andDSR. An iterative
process is not required to search for a specific destination, as the
forwarding decisions will be made by each sensor node in a greedy
manner. This allows the process to be finished in O(n ∗m), where
n equals the number of sensor nodes andm equals the number of
destination nodes per sensor node, which is fk − 1. Furthermore,
there are no additional communication overhead. In case of storage
overhead, if we assume a 2-dimensional deployment, the size of
routing tables are (Sc ∗ 2) ∗ (fk − 1), where Sc denotes the size of
coordinates.
4.4 Route distribution
After the creation of multi-hop routes for all nodes, the itinerant
sink can now begin the next trip, in which the routes are distributed
to all the sensor nodes. Through the map provided by the itinerant
sink node, a sensor node can now transmit its data fragment to the
determined destination nodes.
In regards to maintaining shortest routes, the centralized AODV
andDSRwill guarantee the shortest routes to each destination based
on the best ETX value. However, for GPSR, the selected multi-hop
routes may not be optimal as intermediate nodes may sometimes
not be able to to greedy forwarding due to holes in the map (e.g.
destination is not my neighbor yet I am the closest to it). In this
case, GPSR will initiate perimeter routing, which can also be used
by the sensor nodes in UWSN. However, we believe that if these
forwarding holes are analyzed before by the itinerant sink, we can
further prevent this problem. On how to detect map holes for GPSR
in UWSN will be discussed in our future work.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The performance of our proposed data fragmentation scheme is
evaluated in the FIT/IoT-Lab environment[10]. FIT/IoT-Lab is a
large-scale infrastructure of sensors and embedded devices con-
nectedwith each other throughwireless communication. It provides
various locations of sensor testbed environments in Europe, each
location with a unique deployment of sensors. For our experiments,
we specifically select the maps in Grenoble site and the Lille site,
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Table 2: UWSN Parameters on FIT/IoT-Lab
Notation Value Detail
n 50 No. of sensors
fk 6 No. of fragments per data k
fd 2-5 No. of fragments needed for decoding k
wherewe randomly select 50 sensors for each experiment. Eachmap
has distinctive properties in their topology, where Grenoble map
has sensors installed following long corridors of indoor buildings,
creating long multi-hop scenarios, while Lille map has uniform
grid topology of sensors in 3-dimensional space. Therefore, in the
Grenoble map, the attacker will also follow this straight line to
attack sensor nodes in order, while in the Lille map, the attacker
will attempt a circular movement to account for all nodes in the
network. In the current version of the FIT/IoT-Lab, mobile sinks
cannot be easily used. Therefore, we make an abstract model of the
itinerant sink and the attacker, which can be implemented through
a front-end management module provided by the service. For exam-
ple, according to a mobility model, we can command a sensor node
to behave as if the data was collected or it was attacked, and the
information of the attack is propagated to the front-end computers
for analysis.
5.1 Security evaluation of proposed scheme
For performance comparison, we compare our proposed multi-
hop fragment distribution scheme using centralized routing tech-
niques to their traditional routing methods, and also the random
and NEAR-FIRST approach. The main factors for comparison is
the attack success ratio by the attacker. For the variable parameter
we use the number of rounds required by the attacker to success-
fully exploit the data. This means that the attacker will need to
attack certain amount of sensor nodes, while the mobile sink must
collect the required data before the needed number of rounds by
the adversary. In each round, one attacker will make a movement
towards a node, and exploit its data. Therefore, in this scenario, it
will clearly show that more efficient fragment dispersion methods
will force the attacker to use more rounds to exploit the data. The
static parameters are shown in TABLE 2.
In Fig. 3(a), we observe the performance of the proposed scheme,
which uses k −means clustering to create clusters in the network
and disperse fragments in each cluster. This allows fragments to
be fairly evenly distributed, providing the lowest attack success
among the three methods. The reason that Near − First method
performs better than the other methods at the ending phase (round
40-50) is due to some cases where the movement of an attacker may
arrive at the location of the bunched fragments only at the very
end. However, this depends mainly on a random variable, and most
security-based use cases will need a much higher requirement , for
example 0% attack rate, depending on the application requirements.
In case of the proposed scheme, the performance of remaining at
0% attack rate is more than 100% better than random method, and
over 6 times higher than near-first scheme.
In Fig. 3(b), we can observe the effect of having multiple attack-
ers in the network. Here in this scenario, we configure one more
attacker which moves in the opposite direction of the other attacker,
towards the center of the network. As seen from the graph, the
performance radically decreases compared to having just one at-
tacker. This is especially due to the topology of the network, as
the limited directions of mobility allows the attackers to quickly
converge towards themselves, exploiting all nodes without any re-
dundancy in their attack. However, even in this case, the proposed
scheme performs as twice as better than the random (6 rounds vs
12 rounds).
In Fig. 3(c), we observe the performance of the proposed scheme
while configuring the value of fd . Although it is quite intuitive that
the more number of fragments required to decode the data provides
more security, it is also true that sink node will also require more
time to decode the data as well. Furthermore, if the adversary is
launching a data deletion attack, then the performance of this graph
is exactly inverted, meaning that fd = 2 will perform like fd = 5
and vice versa. This is because in the case of data deletion attack,
for example, the adversary only need to delete 2 fragments if fd = 5.
Therefore, depending on the capability of the sink node and type
of attack, it will be important to select an appropriate value of fd .
From Fig. 4(a) and Fig. 4(c), we can observe that the performance
between the two maps are different. For example, the performance
of the proposed scheme has deteriorated in the Lille map. This is
due to the possibility of a more dynamic movement for the adver-
sary, which can select sensor nodes from a wider range of choices
compared to the line topology of theGrenoble map. This forces the
adversary to only travel through the line, making the pattern more
predictable and monotonous. Even though the performance of the
proposed scheme has deteriorated in the Lille map, it still outper-
forms the other methods, where in the best case it can last about
4 rounds more than the random method in reaching 20% attack
chance. On the other hand, Fig. 4(b) shows a different performance
trend compared to Fig. 3(b), as depending on the starting location
of the attackers, the movement can become redundant due to their
circular search procedure.
Finally, we observe the d(fk ) value, which represents the aver-
age distance between the fragments. Fig. 5(a) shows the average
distance values from both Grenoble and Lille sites. The values of
distances are normalized to the Near − First method. From the
figure, we can observe that the proposed scheme maintains the
highest value of average distance between fragments, which di-
rectly related to its security performance. However, this will also
increase the transmission overhead that will be required to transfer
the fragments in a multi-hop manner. The distance value is slightly
higher for the Lille map, as it can provide a more balanced form
of clustering within the grid and fragments can be dispersed with
more distance.
5.2 Overhead evaluation of proposed scheme
From the security analysis, we have observed that our method of
selecting multi-hop sensor nodes for fragment dispersal can provide
higher security than other methods. However, multi-hop transfer
of fragments require a usage of routing protocol inside the network,
which is bound to consume energy. As the fragmentation process
itself increases the energy consumption, it is important to keep
the overhead of the routing protocol as low as possible. Here we
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(a) Dispersion methods vs Attack success percentage (b) 2 attackers (c) Effect of fd
Figure 3: Performance Evaluation of Proposed Scheme in Grenoble map
(a) Dispersion methods vs Attack success percentage (b) 2 attackers (c) Effect of fd
Figure 4: Performance Evaluation of Proposed Scheme in Lille map
(a) Average distance between fragments (b) Computational complexity of routing protocols (c) Communication complexity of routing protocols
Figure 5: Overhead evaluation of proposed scheme
make a mathematical analysis using MATLAB and compare the
computational complexity of the routing protocols within the sink
node and communication complexity for the sensor nodes. Note that
our objective is not to make a comparison of the overhead between
the proposed scheme and Near − First or Random method, as it is
intuitive that multi-hop communication will induce more overhead.
Instead, we emphasize that our main goal here is to reduce the
overhead that is induced from the routing protocol.
Fig. 5(b) shows the computational complexity of the central-
ized routing protocols proposed in this work. The complexity is
computed by counting the number of instructions executed by the
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itinerant sink. We assume that the itinerant sink makes a calcula-
tion of the routes of all nodes every time it finishes a sink trip. In
the figure, we can observe that GPSR induces the lowest overhead
among the protocols. This is because GPSR does not induce any
control overhead, using only the geographical information acquired
from the clustering phase of the proposed scheme. Therefore, we
can conclude that although all the routing protocols can be used,
GPSR could be favorable for specific applications where there are
limitations in the sink, or if there are numerous amount of sensor
nodes in the network. Note that if traditional routing versions are
used instead, they induce very little to no overhead at the mobile
sink’s side because the calculations are all done by sensor nodes in
a distributed manner. The load induced at the sink side is higher
for the proposed centralized routing protocols. However, we argue
that the trade-off of increasing the computational load of sink to
decrease the communication of sensor node is beneficial in UWSN,
because in practice it is difficult to provide high-capacity energy
sources to sensor nodes while mobile sink is easily retrievable and
rechargeable.
Fig. 5(c) shows the communication overhead of control messages
for the routing protocols. Here we assume that one sensor node
creates one data per one itinerant sink trip. Also, the route table
timeout of AODV and DSR is shorter than one sink trip, so route
requests must be made by each node per sink trip. Here we only
show the comparison of AODV and its centralized counterpart. This
is because DSR has similar broadcast/unicast properties as AODV,
while GPSR does not induce any control overhead. In our case, we
have utilized the itinerant sink to approximate their locations, as
explained in the previous section. In the figure, we can observe
that the control overhead from route request and route reply has
dramatically decreased. In terms of reducing control overhead, it
could be argued that only GPSR need to be used, because GPSR
does not need any route request exchanges while AODV and DSR
is heavy in terms of overhead. However, we note that the routing
paths created by GPSR is not shortest-hop, due to its greedy routing
approach. Therefore, depending on specific applications, AODV
or DSR can also be used, in which case our method can clearly
provide better utilization of these protocols. As a conclusion, we
sacrifice the resources of the itinerant sink, which does the jobs of
the sensor nodes in a centralized manner. Through this, we gain
significant reduction in control overhead, which results in less
energy consumption from packet transmission per node.
6 DISCUSSIONS
Here in this section, we discuss some limitations of our work, and
how we will try to tackle them in our future research.
6.1 On the tradeoff between energy and data
survivability
As explained in our analysis, the distance between sensor nodes
and the data originator causes additional transmission overhead.
Therefore, there clearly exists a tradeoff between level of security
(survivability of the data) and energy consumption. Although we
have addressed the issues of reducing overhead in the routing proto-
col itself, we do not address this tradeoff in this work. This problem
will be considered in our future work, as we believe the level of
security needed in the network can be dynamically controlled by
predicting and analyzing the current and future danger level of the
network.
6.2 On the concentration of fragments on edge
sensor nodes
In our current work, we utilize a random method to select a sensor
within each area of the network. This was used because the method
of choosing the most distant sensor nodes is not feasible as it may
concentrate usage of energy to only the edge nodes, causing various
aforementioned problems. We believe that within an area, there
can be more efficient methods on selecting the most ideal sensor
node not only based on d(fk ), but also on other important factors
such as residual energy, number of fragments already in storage,
link quality, etc. How to intelligently utilize these parameters will
be also a focus of our future work.
6.3 On the usage of our attacker and sink
model
In our work, we model the mobility of the attacker and sink accord-
ing to a realistic design and a specific environment case; for example
a drone physically accessing the sensor node to destroy/exploit data.
Note that this can be considered as a general scenario of UWSN,
and we believe that our work is a general modeling and observa-
tion of such scenario. However, depending on the development
of attacking methods and applications in IoT environment, other
numerous models of attacks and movements will be bound to occur
in the future. Even in such complex cases, we believe that we can
utilize our current UWSN model as a benchmark, and enhance it
for more complex scenarios and environments, to analyze further
threats that may affect the reliability of UWSNs,
6.4 Enhancement to the routing protocols
In our work, we have modified existing distributed ad hoc routing
protocols to operate under centralized circumstances. However,
instead of just converting their computational properties, we be-
lieve that each routing protocol itself can be enhanced for UWSN
environments. For example, when selecting destinations for frag-
ment dispersion, destinations can be selected via clusters, instead
of selecting individual sensor nodes. This allows routing tables of
AODV to operate in a more efficient way, as the entries in the rout-
ing table will never be higher than the number of fragments. For
the selection of sensor nodes inside a cluster to store the fragment,
anycasting methods can be used to randomly select a node and
forward the data inside the cluster.
GPSR also has a problem in its greedy forwarding process; if
the node that needs to forward the data is the physically closest
node to the destination, then it must return the data packet to the
previous node. Even though routing loop can be prevented through
the right-hand rule, this still induces redundant data transmission.
However, in UWSN, as the itinerant sink has the global map of the
network, the right-hand rule does not need to be used to avoid holes
in the network. This means that the holes in the network can be
detected, which will allow the sink to pre-calculate the best routes
to the destination node while avoiding network holes. Therefore,
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GPSR can also become more efficient in terms of computational
complexity within the itinerant sink’s decision making process.
7 CONCLUSION
Unattended wireless sensor networks is an interesting and trendy
area of research, which we believe can be used in many future appli-
cations and services, especially following the current trend of IoT.
For its security, data fragmentation can be used, but how to place
the fragments in a multi-hop manner is an important topic that
needs to be resolved. To solve this problem, we have designed an
analytical model of a basic UWSN and presented some observations.
Furthermore, we argue that existing routing protocols cannot be
used for UWSN, as they induce high level of communication over-
head which is undesirable for energy-limited sensors. Therefore,
we modify the routing protocols to behave in a centralized manner,
saving the energy cost of UWSN.
Through our analytical and experimental results, we show that
our proposed scheme can provide more than 100% performance
increase in preventing attacks from adversaries. Furthermore, com-
pared to the traditional routing protocols, our proposed centralized
routing approach can save energy consumed from route control
overhead. We also propose a method of approximating location of
sensors using the itinerant sink, allowing geographical routing to
be used. We believe that the results we have acquired is promising,
but we also believe that it can be further improved. In the future,
we will make more complex models of the sink/adversary to ex-
periment with more practical environments. We will also tune the
routing protocols and enhance them to make them more suitable
for data fragment dispersal.
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